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
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
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Defense: Passive or Positive?

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Another round in the campaign against that epitome of all evil, Lin Biao, is under way throughout China. Radio broadcasts indicate that criticism sessions are being conducted in nearly all provinces, and in these accounts the mask has begun to slip. The propaganda tune for Lin is still "swindlers like Liu Shao-chi," but the unnamed "swindlers" are now frequently referred to as "he," indicating more clearly than ever that a specific individual is under attack. In this connection, a broadcast from Kiangsi Province reporting a criticism campaign within the provincial military command is of particular interest.

After disposing to its own satisfaction of a number of the issues raised in the infamous "571 document," which is purported to have been written by Lin's adherents, the broadcast goes on to note that organs of the command "criticized the bourgeois military line and the strategic principle of passive defense pushed by swindlers like Liu Shao-chi...[and] analyzed and criticized the so-called 'tactical principles' of swindlers like Liu Shao-chi one by one in accordance with Chairman Mao's ten principles of operation." Mao's concept of operations, the broadcast adds, "consists of people's war and the strategic principle of positive defense." Discussions of military strategy are extremely rare in Chinese media, and for this reason alone the broadcast would be arresting.

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Attention is still paid to the notion of people's war, but it is now joined with the principle of "positive defense" which appears to have been elevated to a new strategic principle. Lin is now being blamed for the bad old policy, but the shift began before his fall and there is no evidence that the new policy was pushed through in the teeth of his personal opposition.

Assigning blame to Lin for mistaken military policies is, of course, a political move, but one that has not surfaced in this form before. The only known attack on Lin for military shortcomings attempted to denigrate his personal role in the Manchurian campaign during the Civil War.

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Dividing the Pie

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China's political and administrative apparatus is being reorganized at provincial levels and below. The aim is apparently to restore the pre-Cultural Revolution system of parallel party and government structures with separate personnel and distinct responsibilities. Since the Cultural Revolution, party and government functions have been consolidated in so-called revolutionary committees. In the new multi-phased reorganization scheme, the revolutionary committees are to be phased out. Some of their functions are to be taken over by party committees; others will be taken over by newly formed governmental organizations. The actual process is slowed by the reluctance of some revolutionary committees to relinquish their authority and by wrangling over who should be named to the new party committees.

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[redacted] instructions were issued in mid-1972 calling for revolutionary committees to assist in forming party branches. Political power was to be gradually transferred from the revolutionary committees to party committees, and administrative power was to be turned over to professional managers. When this process was completed, the revolutionary committees were to be abolished.

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Some progress has been made in Fukien. The provincial party committee recently regained such functions as supervision of propaganda and the recruitment and training of cadres. Elsewhere, progress has been uneven. [redacted]

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[redacted] revolutionary committee signboards have been removed, but that the committees remain intact because no replacement organizations have been activated. [redacted] some revolutionary committees have been abolished or are operating at a reduced level after relinquishing some of their duties to party branches. [redacted] attributes the slow progress to the unwillingness of revolutionary committees to give up their power.

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The first step in the reorganization effort—the completion of the party rebuilding process which began in 1969—has encountered obstacles. Last month, provincial work conferences in Anhwei and Kirin linked party-building with the need to bring in new cadres; the idea of moving in new officials is meeting resistance. The Kirin conference report attacked those who “still cannot fully understand the importance of training and promoting new cadres.” The chief opponents of enlisting new cadres are those officials rehabilitated after the Cultural Revolution who are now vying with the newcomers for party posts. Judging from changes in provincial-level party committees, many more veterans than newcomers are winning party jobs, and the same pattern may be emerging at lower levels. This trend is sure to arouse the antipathy of those who want more new blood in the party.

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Personnel problems will intensify as revolutionary committees disband. In areas where party and revolutionary committees have coexisted for several years, revolutionary committee leaders have usually doubled as party bosses and will probably retain their party posts. The same does not hold true for ordinary members of the revolutionary committees, both rehabilitated veterans and newcomers, who could find themselves without work when the committees close down.

There has been speculation that the revolutionary committees will be replaced by "people's councils," which were the administrative organization of local government before the Cultural Revolution. In any event, some kind of government apparatus will have to emerge after the passing of the revolutionary committees. Details are probably still under discussion, but the relationship between the party committees and administrative units is likely to be more clearly defined than has been the relationship between party and revolutionary committees.

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Accentuating the Positive

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The Chinese have maintained the momentum of the growing rapprochement with the US since liaison offices were formally opened in Washington and Peking. Peking has apparently used its influence in Hanoi to encourage reasonable compliance with the Indochina cease-fire agreements. In Western Europe, the Chinese have gone so far as to urge statesmen there to be "understanding" of US problems and to continue to cooperate fully in the military sphere with Western Europe's "traditional ally." In Japan, a visiting Chinese delegation scrupulously avoided criticizing the US military presence there, despite the goadings of Japanese leftists. NCNA has avoided all commentary on the Watergate affair, and privately Chou En-lai has dismissed it as a "domestic matter." Chinese diplomats are saying more and more frequently that, despite the Taiwan problem, they expect a full normalization of Sino-US relations in the not distant future.

The Chinese have also made it clear that they are anxious to expand trade with the US as quickly as possible. During his first meeting with Ambassador Bruce, Chinese Foreign Trade Minister Pai Hsiang-Kuo not only emphasized his desire for more trade, but also expressed his interest in establishing contacts with additional American businessmen. In this context, Pai glowed over Chinese statistics, claiming that Chinese imports from the US for 1973 have already reached over a half billion dollars, more than the total for all of 1972.

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Cultural and educational exchanges are also on the upswing. Chou recently agreed to receive nine US scientific delegations and to send several scientific and technological groups as well as some students to the US (see following article). Another prominent American or US delegation arrives in Peking virtually every week; they get red carpet treatment, often including meetings with Chou and Chiao Kuan-hua. NCNA is devoting considerable attention to the Chinese journalists and gymnasts now in the US, and Chinese media gave heavy play to President Nixon's

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welcoming statement to China's Washington representative, Huang Chen.

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The Chinese Are Coming!

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The Committee on Scholarly Communications with the People's Republic of China, a group sanctioned by the US Government, wound up a successful stay in Peking by concluding agreements with Premier Chou En-lai for Sino-American scientific and educational exchanges. Over the next year or two, American scientific delegations will visit China to view Chinese work in the fields of botany, earthquake research, pharmacology, acupunctural anaesthesiology, archaeology, and Chinese linguistics. In return, the Chinese will send delegations of scientists to the US to study seismology, treatments for heart diseases, English linguistics, library science, computer technology, laser research, and photosynthesis. Few of the exchanges will allow the US access to China's major technological institutions. None of the proposed US delegations will be exposed to high technology in China; China, on the other hand, stands to gain valuable insights into some advanced US technology. The Chinese proposals for inviting and sending scientific delegations contain general reciprocity in most of the suggested fields with a few exceptions—computers, lasers, and photosynthesis. Apparently, it is not the intent of either the US or China to apply strict reciprocity to these exchanges.

The PRC is not yet interested in exchanges in the social sciences. China's reluctance on this score is partly because of the continued inactivity in their social science institutes which were closed during the Cultural Revolution. The institutes may reopen this year. Exchanges in this field will not come quickly, however, because of Chinese sensitivity about opening their society to close scrutiny by foreigners.

The agreement reached by the committee and Chou also provides for the exchange of undergraduate and perhaps postgraduate students. The Chinese will probably send students to the US to study some of the same topics the scientific delegations will be looking into. The Chinese students are also expected to enroll in programs such as agronomy and chemical and metallurgical engineering. Gradually, programs of more direct defense interest, like nuclear engineering and telecommunications, may be included.

During the negotiations, Chou expressed the hope that large numbers of Chinese-Americans now enrolled in schools in the US would ultimately come to China. Chou's interest in attracting Chinese-Americans is not surprising; ever since the Chinese opened their doors to visitors in 1971, they have been partial to ethnic Chinese. Peking hopes that some qualified Chinese-Americans will decide to settle in China. It may also hope that ethnic Chinese will be more tolerant of conditions in China, particularly at the universities.

One of the reasons the Chinese have avoided educational and scientific exchanges with the US in the past has been their desire to prevent embarrassing meetings between their people and the numerous Chinese Nationalists at American universities and research facilities. Currently, 15 Chinese physicists specializing in high energy are visiting the US; the Chinese backed out of an arrangement that would have permitted three of them to remain at Brookhaven National Laboratories for several months because of the presence there of Chinese Nationalists. The problem is likely to crop up repeatedly as the exchange program progresses.

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Weather Watch

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China's officials have voiced concern about adverse weather in parts of the country. During a conversation with Ambassador Bruce on 6 May, Peking party boss Wu Te and Foreign Ministry Information Director Peng Hua stated that portions of North China are "very dry due to the lack of rainfall," and that South China had had "really too much" rain. Similar remarks were made to another USLO officer by a Chinese official on June 5th.

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Chinese provincial press and radio broadcasts have also shown concern. Kwangtung and Hainan Island have both complained about "abnormal weather," and

northern province of Hopeh, which surrounds Peking, 70,000 cadres have been sent to the "grassroots" to combat local drought. Most provinces have cautioned farmers to prepare for any contingency, "no matter how unlikely." Localized bad weather is neither uncommon nor especially serious, and independent weather information indicates growing conditions for the current crop are generally favorable. Exhortations to prepare for the worst are pro forma in Communist China, but the exhortations this year seem to have taken on a sense of urgency in view of last year's sub-normal harvest.

There are undoubtedly those in the leadership who would use a disappointing harvest to attack their colleagues who back the current moderate agricultural policies. Warnings against any "overemphasis" on sideline production and private plots have already appeared, but the advocates of the policies seem alert to the threat. In what may be the start of a nationwide effort to head off future criticism, they have attacked "swindlers" (read Lin Piao and supporters) for "sabotaging" the moderate measures favored by Chou En-lai. On the theory that if Lin opposed these policies they must be right, the broadcasts from Tibet and Kwangtung defend Chou's policy of a "planned and proportional development of the national economy."

Chou En-lai is very likely on the defensive about the substandard harvest last year. A second straight disappointing year would make him vulnerable to more pointed criticism for his agricultural policies and would reduce his options in this area.

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Leadership Notes

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Yeh Chien-ying, China's de facto defense minister and a member of the ruling Politburo, was present at Mao's meeting on 5 June with North Vietnamese party and government leaders. Yeh is only the third Politburo member to attend such a meeting since the Chairman began the practice of receiving foreign visitors in his study. Chou En-lai is always present on these occasions, and last February Chang Chun-chiao, often rumored to be Mao's successor, attended one of the sessions. Yeh's appearance with the Chairman underlines his importance in the current leadership, especially because Mao has not appeared with any other member of the Politburo in more than a year. [REDACTED]

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Mao's wife, Chiang Ching, attended a rally in Peking on 7 June to welcome the visiting North Vietnamese. This was her first appearance since May Day and the first time she has appeared with rehabilitated party veteran Teng Hsiao-ping. Chiang Ching was conspicuously absent when Teng reappeared on 12 April, giving rise to speculation that she opposed his return to grace. Her appearance with him almost two months later will probably be interpreted as acceptance, however grudging, of his rehabilitation. [REDACTED]

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Leadership turnouts in connection with the visiting North Vietnamese have underscored the unusual status of Peking party boss Wu Te. Wu's ranking among the leadership has fluctuated widely over the past few years, suggesting that the problem of where to list him in public announcements is a sensitive issue. At the airport reception on 4 June, Wu, a central committee member, was listed last among central leaders, even behind such people as foreign minister Chi Peng-fei, who is not a central committee member. That evening he attended a banquet at which he was ranked with a group of leaders just below Politburo level. The higher ranking is probably a more accurate reflection of his actual standing in the leadership. Wu retained the higher listing in subsequent turnouts for the North Vietnamese, but if the record is any indication, his listing will probably rise and fall several more times before the issue is settled. [REDACTED]

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CHRONOLOGY

23 May	31st anniversary of Mao's talks on literature and art observed quietly. <i>People's Daily</i> did not mention the anniversary, but did point to the cultural role of Mme. Mao. The paper urged writers to resume their work, but stopped short of repeating last year's call to "let 100 flowers bloom."	25X1
24 May	US medical delegation arrives in Peking.	25X1
24 May-1 June	Foreign minister of Mauritius visits China.	25X1
27 May	Chou En-lai meets with the Committee on Scholarly Communications with the PRC and approves numerous exchange projects.	25X1
28 May-5 June	Algerian military delegation led by Colonel Mohamed Zerguini visits PRC.	25X1
29 May-7 June	Swedish Foreign Minister Wickman visits China. Sees Chou En-lai and Foreign Minister Chi Peng-fei and signs civil aviation agreement.	25X1
	Huang Chen, chief of the Chinese Liaison Office in the US, arrives in Washington and is received by President Nixon.	25X1
	North Vietnamese Vice Foreign Trade Minister Ly Ban arrives in Peking to negotiate 1974 assistance agreement.	25X1
31 May	Annual Session of Sino-Romanian Joint Commission on Scientific and Technological Cooperation concludes with signing of standard protocol.	25X1
2 June	Leaders of the National Committee on US-China Relations arrive in China for three-week visit.	25X1
	Delegation of Burundi Rwagasore Revolutionary Youth Organization headed by First Secretary General Karenzo Gaspard arrives in Peking.	25X1
4 June	Visiting Japanese delegation of mayors and governors is feted by Kuo Mo-jo.	25X1
	Chou En-lai receives former French prime minister Chaban-Delmas.	25X1
	North Vietnamese party-government delegation, headed by First Secretary Le Duan and Premier Pham Van Dong, arrives in	

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Peking for friendly visit. North Vietnamese delegation is received by Chou En-lai and talks with Mao, Chou and ministerial-level officials. [redacted]

6 June

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Chi Peng-fei arrives in London to begin tour which will take him to Paris on the 10th, to Tehran on the 14th, and back to Peking on the 16th. [redacted]

PRC delegation arrives in Tokyo to plan exhibit of Chinese archeological findings. [redacted]

PRC delegation to the UN Environment Program arrives in Geneva. [redacted]

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7 June

Rally for North Vietnamese delegation held in Peking. Keynote speeches by Le Duan and Yeh Chien-ying indicate divergent views on important issues persist. [redacted]

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8 June


Agreement signed on Chinese economic and military assistance to North Vietnam during 1974. Announcement indicates aid will be weighted on civilian side. [redacted]

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